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a b s t r a c t
Theoretical studies show that compared to decentralized inventory management, (i) pooling inventories
for different demand sources decreases the optimal safety stock, which in turn decreases inventory costs
and (ii) the decrease in stock is related to the correlation between the different demand sources and
variabilities of demands. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) provide a business context to investigate the
effects of correlation and variability of the merging firms’ demands on potential improvements in
inventory performance through inventory pooling. While merging firms may not fully centralize their
inventory decisions, the coordination of inventory and supply chain decisions may result in synergies.
Using firm-level data for 270 same-industry mergers carried out in U.S. between 1981 and 2009, we find
that the inventory turnover of bidder and target firms improves (relative to firms in their industry)
following the successful completion of mergers. The improvement in turnover is especially pronounced
in deals where the demand of bidder and target firms are negatively correlated prior to the merger. Our
results provide novel empirical support for the predictions of theoretical models on inventory economies
in M&A.
& 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In 2013, merger activity reached $2.2 trillion around the world
(Bloomberg M&A database), where our use of the term mergers refers
to both mergers and acquisitions. In their surveys of merger studies,
Jarrell et al. (1988), Andrade et al. (2001), Bruner (2004), Martynova
and Renneboog (2008) and Betton et al. (2008) document that
mergers are persistent across time, industries and countries. This
paper empirically tests theoretical research in operationsmanagement
on inventory pooling using M&A as a research context in which the
two merging firms may centralize inventory management for their
previously separate demand sources.
Mergers may be motivated by the desire to increase shareholder
value through: (i) increasing size and realizing economies of scale and
scope (Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Moeller et al., 2004; Fluck and
Lynch,1999); (ii) redistributing resources to copewith economic shocks
(Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Maksimovic and Phillips,
2001; Andrade et al., 2001); (iii) reaching new sources of capital (Lang
et al., 1989; Holmes and Schmitz, 1995; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001;
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002); and iv) taking advantage of mispricing
in firm shares (Gort, 1969). Moreover, managerial appetite for status
(Jensen, 1986), merger related compensation (Hartzell et al., 2004;
Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), irrational expectations in the form of
hubris in overvaluing targets (Roll 1986), or confirmation bias (Bogan
and Just, 2009) may also explain why management may undertake
mergers. Cremers et al. (2009), Cornett et al. (2011), and Fescioglu-
Unver and Tanyeri (2013) empirically investigate how a combination of
the above factors may motivate mergers.
Operations management literature shows that firms can achieve
economies of scale and realize cost savings when they centralize their
supply chain decision making. Anecdotal evidence supports this view.
According to Bowman (2003), at the time when HP and Compaq
merged, the newly merged company was moving products through
109 distribution centers, which was cut in half after the merger.
Consequently, within the first nine months of the merger, more than
$1 billion supply chain related cost savings such as directmaterials
procurement, logistics, and factory rationalization were realized. U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2006) reports
the motivation between two consumer product packagers to merge as
reducing inventory costs through the consolidation of packaging
facilities. Another example is the merger of Kroger Co. and Fred
Meyer, Inc. The press release states the firm’s “plan to generate [cost]
savings through combined procurement of goods and services,
reduced corporate overhead, in-market synergies, and consolidation
of support services” (Kroger, 1998). Bernile and Bauguess (2010) report
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that 88 percent of publicly released management forecasts onmergers
attribute expected cost savings to elimination of duplicate costs of
layouts, production capabilities, administration, and R&D.
According to theoretical studies in operations management,
coordinating inventory decisions for different demand sources
may decrease inventory costs in two ways. First, merging firms
may realize economies of scale by reducing fixed expenses such as
transportation and stocking costs. Second, as in the seminal work
of Eppen (1979), total safety stock may decrease with inventory
pooling, i.e., by keeping joint inventories to satisfy various uncer-
tain demands. Inventory pooling benefits can be obtained by
physically combining inventories (Ben-Zvi and Gerchak, 2012;
Bouma and Teunter, 2014) as well as, sharing units between
separate inventories—defined as inventory sharing (Grahovac
and Chakravarty, 2001; Çömez et al., 2012; Satir et al., 2012; Tai
and Ching, 2014), coordinating substitutable products’ inventory
management (Bish and Suwandechochai, 2010; Ye, 2014), delaying
the differentiation of the basic product body further down in
production, so that a common inventory can be kept for the basic
product (Tibben-Lembke et al., 2005; Ngniatedema et al., 2015), or
centralizing the inventories of the common components of differ-
ent end products (Baker et al., 1986; Hillier, 2002).
Factors such as correlation between the demands and the varia-
bility in demand may affect the magnitude of benefits from inventory
centralization. Gerchak and Mossman (1992) and Corbett and Rajaram
(2006) show that as the correlation between the different demand
sources decreases, the reduction in inventory costs increases. The
results on how demand variation affects inventory efficiencies are
mixed. Gerchak and He (2003) and Berman et al. (2011) show condi-
tions under which inventory cost savings may increase or decrease
with demand variation. Cai and Du (2009) and Yang and Schrage
(2009) provide an extensive review of studies on inventory pooling.
This paper bridges the theoretical work in operations manage-
ment with the empirical work in corporate finance. We empirically
investigate whether merging firms realize benefits associated with
centralizing inventory management using firm-level data from
270 same-industry mergers with announcement dates ranging
from 1981 to 2009. To test whether merged firms realize any
savings associated with inventory efficiencies, we compare the
inventory turnover of the combined firm one, two, and three years
after the merger is completed to the inventory turnover of the
(hypothetically) combined firm one year before the merger is
announced. Inventory turnover is defined as the ratio of cost of
goods sold to average inventory. We also control for whether the
change in inventory turnover is a result of the change in industry
inventory performance. For this purpose, we benchmark the
change in inventory turnover of the merged firm to the median
change in inventory turnover of the industry.
We find no significant increase in inventory turnover of the
merged firms with respect to industry median in the full sample.
However, this result changes in subsamples split according to demand
correlation, which is measured using the correlation in the cost of
goods sold of merging firms. We find that in mergers where the
demands of the bidder and target firms are negatively correlated, the
inventory turnover of the combined firm increases by 12, 22, and 28
percent, respectively, in the one, two, and three years following the
merger. There is 1, 2, and 1 percent increase in the median industry
turnover of the corresponding mergers, respectively, in the one, two,
and three years following the merger. Hence, the change in industry
turnover does not explain the improvement in the turnover of the
merged firms. Regression analysis confirms that the change in
inventory turnover decreases with demand correlation. The results
support the theoretical models and indicate that merging firms with
negative demand correlation realize inventory efficiencies following
mergers. We find no significant effect of demand variation on the
change in inventory turnover.
We aim to contribute to the literature by empirically testing
theoretical predictions about the inventory pooling benefits and
effects of demand variability and correlation on the magnitude of
potential benefits in actual mergers and acquisitions context. This
study utilizes a novel and large dataset of merging firms. The
findings support the predictions of theoretical models and confirm
that inventory related synergies arise in mergers where the bidder
and target demands are negatively correlated prior to the merger.
In line with theoretical predictions, the pre-merger demand
correlation is the main driver of merger related inventory syner-
gies. Moreover, this paper sheds additional light on how merging
firms realize economies of scale. Results indicate that merged
firms realize economies of scale by reducing inventory costs
possibly resulting from the coordination of the inventory
decisions.
The theoretical work on mergers and empirical work on
inventory pooling are scarce in the operations management
literature. Gupta and Gerchak (2002) build an analytical model
to study the valuation of target firms by considering production
characteristics such as capacity and flexibility. Iyer and Jain (2004)
use a queueing model to study the expected decrease in inventory
costs in a merger of two production–inventory systems.
Alptekinoğlu and Tang (2005) derive an analytical model to
investigate the cost benefits that are expected to be realized in
multi-channel distribution systems, which centralize the ordering
and demand allocation decisions. Güneş and Yaman (2010) for-
mulate an integer programming model to solve the matching
problem of supply and demand in hospital mergers.
Langabeer (2003), Louis (2004), Davila and Wouters (2007) are
empirical studies that investigate the relation between mergers
and inventory performance. Langabeer (2003) studies the absolute
change in supply chain performance around mergers in chemical
and pharmaceutical industries. The author finds that supply chain
performance measured as a joint function of inventory turns,
finished goods inventory, and operating margin decreases after
merger due to adaptation problems. Louis (2004) studies market’s
efficiency in processing manipulated accounting reports using a
sample of merging firms. The author hypothesized inventory
turnover to decrease after merger announcements, because expec-
tations of high post-merger demand would drive the bidder to
build up inventories before the merger. The author tracked
inventory turnover of bidders in the eight quarters around merger
announcements but did not employ any statistical tests on the
change in inventory turnover. Davila and Wouters (2007) use 18-
months of firm-level data from a U.S. disk drive manufacturer that
has implemented a production postponement strategy. They find
that while higher levels of postponement result in higher service
levels, inventory turnover does not change.
Our study differs from these three empirical works on mergers
and inventory management in two respects. First, we use firm-
level data on 270 merger deals (Davila and Wouters, 2007 focus on
one deal) taking place in many industries such as manufacturing,
wholesale and retail trade, transportation (Langabeer, 2003, con-
centrates on deals in pharmaceutical industry). Second, we use
both univariate and multivariate statistical analyses to test the
hypotheses on inventory turnover, while Louis (2004) relies on
summary statistics to describe how inventory turnover evolves
around mergers.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2
develops the hypotheses on inventory efficiencies around mergers
relying on theoretical work on inventory centralization. Section 3
describes the hypothesis testing method and the details of the
data sample that we utilize. Section 4 discusses the results of the
empirical analyses. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper by
summarizing the findings and limitations of the study and
providing guidance for follow-up research.
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2. Hypotheses
Following a merger where target and bidder firms centralize
decision making and start functioning as a single firm, the merged
firm may consolidate at least some of its inventory management
decisions. Consolidating inventory decisions may affect inventory
levels in two ways. First, following the economic order quantity
(EOQ) model (Harris, 1913), economies of scale can be achieved in




is the optimal batch size under an
EOQmodel, where D denotes the demand rate, S is the set-up or order
cost, and h is the holding cost per unit, which are assumed to be
symmetric for merging firms. Assuming that the merged firm
centralizes ordering decisions for two firms that used to make
individual ordering decisions for demands D1 and D2, optimal
consolidated batch size cannot be larger than the sum of the











. As a result, average inventory levels may decrease.
Second, optimal ordering level for consolidated demand can be
different from the sum of optimal levels of independently planned
inventories due to the change in safety inventory. Eppen (1979)
introduced the basic inventory pooling model using newsvendor
setting where there is a single season for a single product and orders
are prepared at the beginning of the season to satisfy random
demands from N different sources. When independently planned,
the optimal initial inventory level for a single source i is F 1i ðzÞ, where
F 1i ð:Þ is the inverse distribution function and z is the margin
contribution of the product. Thus, for N sources, the total unconsoli-
dated initial inventory level is
PNF 1i ðzÞ. On the other hand, when a
joint inventory optimization is made, the total optimal order level is
F 11þ2þ⋯þNðzÞ. Eppen (1979) proves that when demands are identi-
cally normally distributed, the optimal centralized inventory is not
greater than the sum of the N inventories optimized separately. Baker
et al. (1986) and Stulman (1987) confirm this result with service level
constraints. Gerchak and Mossman (1992) and Chen and Lin (1990)
show counter results where inventory increases when the ordering
decision is centralized using different demand distributions. Yang and
Schrage (2009) generalize these results by analytically showing that
when demand distributions are right skewed, optimal inventory
amount may increase after pooling, defined as inventory anomaly.
Using general demand functions, Aydin et al. (2012) show that
centralization decreases inventory levels if the marginal contribution
parameter is high enough. As many real life distributions are shown to
fit to normal distributions, especially when the demand size is large,
Hypothesis 1 is defined relying on the results of the theoretical studies
that used normal distributions for modeling the demand. In Section 4,
following the discussions of testing of Hypothesis 1, this issue is
detailed again.
Hypothesis 1. The post-merger inventory performance of the
merged firm improves when compared to the performance of
the hypothetically combined pre-merger bidder and target firms.
If centralizing inventory decisions can decrease the stocking
amounts, then the next question is what determines the magnitude
of this decrease. One parameter that can affect pooling benefits is the
correlation between the different demand sources. Gerchak and
Mossman (1992) and Gerchak and He (2003) show that as the
correlation coefficient between demand sources decreases from 1 to
1, the pooled demand variability decreases resulting in greater
savings in inventory holding costs. Hillier (2000), Benjaafar et al.
(2005), Corbett and Rajaram (2006) also conclude that the benefit of
pooling increases with the decrease in demand correlation. These
theoretical predictions lead to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. The post-merger inventory performance improve-
ment increases as the pre-merger demand correlation between
bidder and target firms decreases.
Variability of the pooled demands may also affect benefits of
pooling. For general demand distributions and non-identical demand
variabilities, there are mixed results. Concerned about inventory costs,
Gerchak and He (2003) show conditions in which the higher demand
variability increases the benefits of pooling, as well as an example
where increased variability reduces the benefits of risk pooling. Using
a model in which supply lead times are endogenous, Benjaafar et al.
(2005) show that increasing demand variability decreases the benefit
of pooling, which diminishes at very high variability. Berman et al.
(2011) analyze inventory pooling with a distribution-free approach for
multiple identical and independent demand sources. They conclude
that when the variation is below a threshold level, while the absolute
cost savings (difference in costs) is increasing in variability, the relative
savings (ratio of costs) is constant. Beyond this threshold, both the
absolute and relative savings decrease in variation and become zero as
variation increases further. Hypothesis 3 tests the predictions of these
theoretical models.
Hypothesis 3. The post-merger inventory performance improves
with the pre-merger demand variability of bidder and target firms.
3. Sampling frame
We compile the sample of merger deals using Security Database
Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisition database. Our aim is
to investigate whether merging firms improve their inventory perfor-
mance and the effects of demand characteristics on potential changes.
We expect inventory economies to arise in deals where the operations
of bidder and target are centralized after the merger and the bidder
and target carry similar types of inventories. We impose the following
filters to identify a sample of deals where inventory pooling strategy
would be most likely enacted. First, to centralize operations, deals
should be completed and bidders should purchase control rights in
the targets. Second, bidders and targets should operate in the same
industry. For this purpose, mergers are restricted to the ones where
bidder and target share the same 2-digit Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation (SIC) code. Although, restricting the merging firms to the same
3 or 4-digit SIC code would identify mergers taking place in more
similar industries, it significantly reduces the available dataset for
statistical analysis. Third, bidder and target should be non-financial
firms since financial firms carry no significant amount of inventory.
Fourth, we drop all merger deals by the same target or bidder (except
for the first one) in order to attribute the change in inventory
performance to the specific merger. These filters produce 7,598 deals
with announcement dates ranging from January 1981 to Nove-
mber 2009.
We compile financial statement data on merging firms using
COMPUSTAT quarterly database. We collect data on cost of goods
sold, inventory, and total assets (COMPUSTAT data items are “cogsq”,
“inventory turnoverq”, and “atq”, respectively). Rumyantsev and
Netessine (2007) show that inventory fluctuates in time with demand
and production seasonality. This is why we use the most frequent data
available which is quarterly. Fig. 1 shows the merger timeline.
Announcement date is the day on which bidder and target announce
their intention to merge and negotiations begin. Effective date is the
date onwhich negotiations are successfully concluded and bidder and
target firms legally merge. The time between announcement and
effective dates marks a period of negotiation and transition. As a
result, the inventory policies within this period may be unusual due to
the transition in operations (Louis, 2004). This is why we restrict pre-
merger analysis to one year before the announcement and the post-
merger analysis to one to three years after the effective date.
We require bidder and target to have data on sales, cost of goods
sold, and inventory in at least one quarter prior to announcement date
and in at least one quarter of each of the three years following the
effective date. If a merging firm has less than four quarters of financial
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data in any year, we extrapolate the missing data by taking the
average of the available data in that year. The availability of financial
statement data on bidder and target firms prior to the merger and on
the merged firm after the merger reduces the sample to 270 deals.
Table 1 tabulates the distribution of the deals according to industry. 64
percent of deals take place in the manufacturing industry, 12 percent
in transportation and 11 percent in retail trade industries.
Inventory pooling theory measures inventory in units. However,
data on inventory is available in dollars. Theory also assumes that
demand is stationary in time. In practice, demands of merging firms
need not be stationary in time due to seasonality, macro-economic
factors, competition, and changing customer preferences (Rumyantsev
and Netessine, 2007). Moreover, one of the reasons for undertaking
mergers is to increase the market share and demand of merging firms
(Gugler et al., 2003). As a result, change in inventory may arise due to
the change in demand and not the effect of inventory pooling. Our
data shows that in the four-year window around the merger, cost of
goods sold (a measure of dollar demand) increases by 6 percent
annually on average. To isolate the effect of inventory pooling from the
change in demand, we use inventory turnover as the measure of
inventory performance. Inventory turnover normalizes inventory by
cost of goods sold and accounts for the effect of the change in
demand. When using inventory turnover, there is no need to deflate
cost of goods sold and inventory. Both the numerator and denomi-
nator in inventory turnover are in dollars and affected by inflation (see
also Rajagopalan and Malhotra, 2001; Chen et al., 2005; Rumyantsev
and Netessine, 2007).
We calculate annual inventory turnover by dividing the aggre-
gated quarterly cost of goods sold by average quarterly inventory.
We drop observations with inventory turnover less than 1 or
greater than 100 to eliminate outliers (Chen et al., 2005). Let Cogsitq
denote the cost of goods sold by firm i in quarter q of year t and
Invitq the inventory level at the end of quarter q of year t. Then, the










In the same spirit as Harris et al. (2000), we compute pre-
merger combined inventory turnover by summing the annual cost
of goods sold for the bidder and target and dividing it by their
average combined inventories in the year before the announce-
ment. For this purpose, Cogsit ¼
P4
q ¼ 1
Cogsitq denotes the annual cost




average inventory of the firm in year t. Pre-merger inventory
turnover of the hypothetically merged firm is denoted by InvTt1.
Post-merger inventory turnover of the merged firm is calculated in
each of the three years following effective date and denoted by
InvTtþ j, for jA{1, 2, 3}. Below, superscript b denotes the bidder and







We estimate demand variation of bidder and target firms and
the demand correlation between the bidder and target by using cost
of goods sold as a proxy for demand. Sales can also proxy for
demand (Cachon et al., 2007). We estimate the demand correlation
using the correlation between the cost of goods sold for the bidder
and target firms before the effective date. In the spirit of Randall
et al. (2006), we compute the coefficient of variation to measure
demand variability. We require bidder and target to have at least
three quarters of data before the merger announcement to estimate
demand correlation and variation. The number of quarters used to
estimate correlation and coefficient of variation ranges from 3 to
125 quarters with a mean of 35 quarters. The deals with early
announcement dates have less number of quarters prior to the
announcement to estimate correlation and coefficient of variation.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the bidders, targets, and
hypothetically merged firms in the one year before the announcement
and on the merged firm in the three years following the effective date.
There are 270 deals in the sample. However, we could not find data on
cost of goods sold and inventory in the three years following the
merger for all deals. We can calculate inventory turnover in the one
year following effective date for all merged firms, in the two years for
248 firms, and in the three years following for 230 firms. To track
firms through time, we required that merged firms have data on all
years following the merger. When we relax the requirement, the
results remain qualitatively the same. Both inventory and cost of
goods sold of the merged firm increase following the effective date
relative to the inventory and cost of goods sold of the hypothetically
merged firm prior to announcement. Table 2 also shows that the size
(measured as the book value of assets) of the merged firm increases
relative to that of the hypothetically combined firm prior to the
announcement date.
Fig. 1. Merger timeline.
Table 1
Industry distribution of sample deals.






40,45,48–49 Transportation and communication
services
12
50–51 Wholesale trade 2
52–59 Retail trade 11
72,73,75,79,80,87 Services 5.6
99 Other 0.7
Sample size (N): 270
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Table 2 shows that inventory and cost of goods sold for the
median firm in the industry of merging firms is increasing. We use
the median firm and not the mean firm since the mean may be
affected by extreme values (Chen et al., 2005). Hence, the increase
in cost of goods sold and inventory of merged firms may be an
industry-wide effect. Rajagopalan and Malhotra (2001), Chen et al.
(2005), Gaur et al. (2005) state that due to production planning
practices such as just-in-time and use of computerized stock
planning systems, inventories tend to decrease. On the other hand,
economic fluctuations, changes in end customer demand patterns,
oil prices, as well as competition may lead to an overall inventory
pile up in an industry. Because of industry-wide trends, the
inventory performance of a merger should not be evaluated in
isolation from its industry. Hence we benchmark the change in
inventory and cost of goods sold of a merging firm against the
change in the median firm in its industry.
4. Results
The first hypothesis investigates whether the inventory perfor-
mance of the merged firm improves relative to the pre-merger
performance of bidder and target firms. If the hypothesis holds,
inventory turnover of the combined firm following the merger should
prove higher than the inventory turnover of the hypothetically
combined firm prior to the merger. Industry-wide trends can affect
the inventory policy of individual firms. As a result, we benchmark the
change in inventory turnover of the merged firm to that of the median
firm in its industry. We measure the change in inventory turnover in
two ways. First, we take the ratio of inventory turnover in the three
years following effective date to inventory turnover in the one year
before the announcement. Second, we take the difference of inventory
turnover in the three years following effective date and inventory
turnover in the one year before the announcement. Benjaafar et al.
(2005) and Berman et al. (2011) utilize a similar dual comparison
method in their analytical studies.
Panel A of Table 3 compares the change in inventory turnover of
the merging firms to the change in inventory turnover of the median
firm in the industry, which is denoted by superscriptm for each of the
three years following the merger, i.e., j¼1, 2, 3, in terms of both ratio
and difference change in inventory turnover. The inventory turnover
of the merged firm increases by: 2 percent in the one year, 4 percent
in the two years, and 6 percent in the three years following the
effective date. In the three years following the effective date, industry
turnover increases by at most 2 percent. Testing for whether the
improvement in inventory turnover of the merged firm is different
than the change in turnover for the median firm in the industry, we
find the difference to be significant in the third year following the
merger. Table 3, like Table 2, requires that merged firms have data on
all years following the merger. When we relax the requirement, the
results remain qualitatively the same and are statistically more
significant.
We also evaluate the change in inventory turnover around the
merger by taking the absolute difference between the post-
inventory turnover of merged firm and the pre-inventory turnover
of the hypothetically combined firm (InvTtþ j InvTt1) for j¼1, 2,
3. The difference in inventory turnover of the merged firms
relative to the change in the inventory turnover of median
industry firm proves negative and insignificant in the three years
following the effective date as reported in Panel A of Table 3.
The evidence from the ratio test and the difference test is
contradictory. The ratio test indicates that turnover relative to
industry increases (albeit at no statistical significance for the
first two years) whereas the difference test indicates that
turnover decreases (again at no statistical significance in all three
years).
The difference in tests is due to size of inventory turnover. The
ratio test looks at the relative change in performance and gives equal
weight to all merging firms in the sample. The difference test looks at
the absolute change in performance and gives higher weight to
merging firms, which had larger inventory turnovers to begin with.
This indicates that merging firms who had large inventory turnovers
prior to the merger announcement improved their inventory turnover
ratios less after the effective date when compared to firms who had
small inventory turnover ratios to begin with.
Full sample results in Panel A do not fully support the hypoth-
esis that inventory efficiencies improve after the merger. The
second hypothesis calibrates the first hypothesis and states that
merging firms with low demand correlation should benefit most
from the merger in terms of inventory economies. As such, we
construct two subsamples, one that contains deals with negative
demand correlation (Panel B) and one that contains deals with
positive demand correlation (Panel C) before the merger.
In deals with negative demand correlation, inventory turnover
of the merged firm increases by 12, 22, and 28 percent in the 1, 2,
and 3 years following the effective date, respectively. This increase
when benchmarked against the change in the median industry
firm proves significant at less than five percent. The results of
inventory turnover difference tests are qualitatively similar. The
difference in inventory turnover proves positive and when bench-
marked against the median industry firm, it is marginally sig-
nificant in the one and two years following the merger and
significant in the three years following the merger. We fail to find
any significant change in inventory turnover for merging firms
with positive demand correlation.
The results indicate that in an average merger, inventory perfor-
mance does not increase significantly (evidenced in Panel A). It is in
deals of merging firms with negative demand correlations that
inventory performance increases (evidenced in Panel B). We attribute
the increases in inventory turnover to the possible centralization of
inventory management following mergers. As we do not have
information on the individual policy changes that are enacted follow-
ing a merger, we cannot forcefully say the results are due to a strategic
change to pool inventories. However, in the spirit of Occam’s razor, the
simplest explanation that is provided by inventory pooling theory
would explain our results.
Hypothesis 1 is based on the stream of theoretical studies that
model normal demand distributions such as the earliest work of
Eppen (1979). Based on the skewness coefficients for cost of goods
sold, which is our proxy for demand, we tested and rejected the
null hypothesis for a normally distributed demand for both the
target and bidder prior to the merger in 66 out of the 230 deals.
We conducted unreported (available upon request from authors)
robustness tests using the sample of 66 normal distribution rejects
and the 164 non-rejects. Our results regarding the inventory
turnover following a merger remain qualitatively the same (and
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for bidders, targets, and merged firms (in million $).






Bidder Target Combined Merged Firm
COGS 1864 494 2358 2605 2768 2815
Inventory 294 76 370 412 425 427
Size (total assets) 2499 616 3115 3792 4083 4345
COGS (industry median) 212 218 252 271
Inventory (industry median) 30 32 37 43
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indeed are more pronounced) in the subsample covering deals
where the normality assumption is not rejected.
Tables 4 and 5 investigate the factors that affect the change in
inventory turnover of merging firms using regression analysis. In all
regression specifications, the dependent variable is the ratio of post-
inventory turnover (one year after the effective date in Panel A, two
years in Panel B, and three years in Panel C) to pre-inventory turnover
(one year before announcement date) in Table 4 and the difference of
post-inventory turnover from pre-inventory turnover in Table 5. The
first column in both tables shows the mean (in the first row) and the
standard deviation (in the second row) of the independent variables.
Industry inventory turnover has three entries denoting the post 1, 2,
and 3 years’ performances, respectively. The mean and standard
deviation of the dependent variables are shown in the first rows of
the tables. In the first regression specification, we only include the
variable of interest, the demand correlation between bidder and target
prior to the effective date. In the second through fourth specifications,
we introduce the variables that proxy for factors that may affect the
change in inventory turnover one by one. Namely, we introduce
controls for: the industry, bidder and target coefficient of variation,
pre-merger inventory turnover, and firm size. In the second specifica-
tion, the independent variables are demand correlation and the
change in inventory turnover of the median industry firm. In the
third specification, we introduce bidder and target coefficient of
variation (cv). In the fourth specification, we add the following control
variables: the ratio of pre-merger inventory turnover of the bidder to
the target and bidder and target sizes.
In all regression specifications in Tables 4 and 5, the change in
inventory turnover of merging firms is inversely related to the
demand correlation between bidder and target. The negative relation
between change in inventory turnover and correlation proves sig-
nificant in the two-year window and marginally significant in the
three-year window in the inventory turnover ratio regressions. The
negative relation also proves marginally significant in the two- and
three-year windows in the inventory turnover difference regressions.
The results support the second hypothesis, which states that centra-
lizing the inventory decision for demand sources with negative
correlation will prove most beneficial.
In all regression specifications in Tables 4 and 5, the bidder coefficient
of variation is negative. The negative bidder coefficient of variation
proves significant in the one-year window in inventory turnover ratio
and difference regressions. The target coefficient of variation proves
positive in all but two ratio regressions, and it is significant in the three-
year window of the ratio regression. Results show that demand
variations at bidder and target firms tend to affect the inventory benefits
in opposite directions. Therefore, our results partially support the third
hypothesis; while the demand variation of the bidder decreases, the
demand variation at the target increases the inventory pooling benefits.
The results indicate that industry-wide trends in inventory do
affect individual firm inventory turnover. The change in the
inventory turnover of the median industry firm proves positive
and significant in all specifications in Tables 4 and 5. The control
variables, relative pre-inventory efficiency of bidder, bidder and
target size, all prove insignificant.
The adjusted R2 in Tables 4 and 5 ranges upto 11 percent. Chen
et al. (2005, 2007) attain higher R2 in their models of inventory
turnover. The higher explanatory power of these models may be
attributed to their use of a greater number of independent variables
and their use of the time trend. In this study, we focus on the change
rather than the level of inventory turnover. Furthermore, we report
adjusted R2. Rumyantsev and Netessine (2007) investigate days in
inventory and similar to our models’ explanatory power their adjusted
R2 ranges from 4 to 29 percent. Finally, we only try to proxy for factors
that may affect the change in inventory turnover as suggested by
inventory pooling theory. These three factors may explain why the
adjusted R2 in our regressions prove lower.
To summarize, we find that the inventory turnovers of bidder
and target firms improve (relative to firms in their industry)
following the successful completion of mergers. We also find that
the improvement in inventory turnover is inversely related with
the demand correlation between bidder and target firms. Our
results provide empirical support for the predictions of theoretical
models on inventory pooling.
5. Summary of findings and directions for further research
In this study, we aim to contribute to empirical research in
operations management and corporate finance by testing the theory
on centralizing inventory decisions using a sample of merging firms.
On the one hand, theoretical models in operations management show
that coordinating the inventory decisions for demands from different
sources may decrease the optimal amount of inventory needed
through both deterministic and statistical economies of scale. On the
other hand, research in corporate finance states economies of scale
and scope as an important merger motive, but does not focus on
inventory efficiencies explicitly. So, the question of whether and how
economies of scale are actually achieved in mergers remained
unanswered. This study aims to answer this question by empirically
testing the hypotheses of theoretical models in mergers and acquisi-
tions context.
After restricting the merger deals to those: completed in similar
industries, that have financial data four years around the merger
activity, and that operate in non-financial services, we end up with
270 deals. We measure inventory performance using inventory turn-
over. Previous studies show that inventory turnover is not constant in
Table 3
Change in inventory turnover of merged firms relative to the change in inventory turnover of the industry median.





p-Value of t-tests InvTtþ j InvTt1 InvTmtþ j InvTmt1 p-Value of t-tests
Panel A: full sample N¼230
j¼1 1.02 1.01 0.33 0.43 0.13 0.93
j¼2 1.04 1.01 0.20 0.25 0.08 0.75
j¼3 1.06 1.01 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.61
Panel B: Firms with () correlation N¼58
j¼1 1.12 1.01 0.04 0.88 0.07 0.10
j¼2 1.22 1.02 0.03 1.51 0.13 0.09
j¼3 1.28 1.01 0.01 2.18 0.01 0.02
Panel C: Firms with (þ) correlation N¼172
j¼1 0.99 1.01 0.82 0.87 0.16 0.99
j¼2 0.98 1.00 0.81 0.84 0.07 0.95
j¼3 0.99 1.00 0.70 0.81 0.09 0.98
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time and there are industry-wide trends. So, we tested whether
merged firms improved their inventory turnover relative to the
median firm in their industry.
While the results do not indicate significant inventory performance
improvements for the average merger, we find significant improve-
ment in inventory performance for bidder and target firms with
negative demand correlation. Theory predicts that the benefits from
inventory pooling increases as the correlation between the pooled
demand sources decreases. Our results support the predictions of
theoretical work and show that in mergers where the bidder and
target firms have negative demand correlation before the merger, the
improvement in inventory performance is significantly higher than
the improvement in their industries.
We find no significant effects of demand variation on pooling
benefits. Actually, the results are consistent with theoretical findings.
First, theoretical studies deal with either symmetric systems or consider
the demand variability increase in only one of the demand sources, and
find contradictory effects of variability on pooling benefits. In a real
merger, the symmetry of firms in terms of demand variation cannot be
guaranteed and we need to consider the individual variations of each
Table 4
Regression analysis of (ratio) change in inventory turnover of merged firms.
Model Descriptive statistics InvTtþ1/InvTt1 (j¼1) InvTtþ2/InvTt1 (j¼2) InvTtþ3/InvTt1 (j¼3)
1.00, [0.39] 1.03, [0.56] 1.06, [0.59]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Correlation coefficient 0.39 6.69 6.13 4.33 4.73 18.17nn 15.50nn 14.69n 15.19n 15.39n 12.52 9.67 10.68
[0.45] [1.28] [1.19] [0.84] [0.90] [2.32] [2.00] [1.88] [1.90] [1.82] [1.52] [1.19] [1.29]
InvTmtþ j/InvTmt1 1.01, 1.01, 1.00 73nnn 70nnn 70nnn 111nnn 108nnn 107nnn 152nnn 140nnn 144nnn
[0.09, 0.10, 0.09] [2.96] [2.86] [2.79] [3.09] [2.99] [2.91] [3.95] [3.73] [3.79]
Bidder cv 0.61 21nnn 20nnn 9.03 11.18 14.99 12.36
[0.31] [2.85] [2.63] [0.79] [0.96] [1.28] [1.03]
Target cv 0.52 6.37 6.66 2.78 2.61 44nnn 45nnn
[0.32] [0.89] [0.92] [0.24] [0.23] [3.52] [3.57]
InvTbt1/InvTgt1 1.52 1.32 2.15 2.78
[1.58] [0.88] [0.94] [1.08]
Bidder size $2,308 0 0 0
[$4,518] [0.07] [0.57] [0.22]
Target size $578 0 0 0
[$1,731] [0.17] [0.10] [0.66]
Intercept 103nnn 29 41 42 110nnn 2.71 3.74 2.53 112nnn 41 44 46
[33.11] [1.15] [1.58] [1.57] [23.49] [0.07] [0.10] [0.06] [22.24] [1.05] [1.13] [1.16]
N 270 270 270 270 248 248 248 248 230 230 230 230
Adj. R2 (%) 0.24 3.04 5.28 4.49 1.75 5.06 4.53 3.84 1 6.95 11.26 10.73
F-test 1.64 5.21 4.75 2.81 5.39 7.58 3.93 2.41 3.31 9.55 8.26 4.93
Notes: Regression coefficients are reported in percent. t-Statistics are shown in square brackets.
n Denotes statistical significance at 10% levels.
nn Denotes statistical significance at 5% levels.
nnn Denotes statistical significance at 1% levels.
Table 5
Regression analysis of the (difference) change in inventory turnover of merged firms.
Model Descriptive statistics InvTtþ1InvTt1 (j¼1) InvTtþ2InvTt1 (j¼2) InvTtþ3InvTt1 (j¼3)
0.59, [6.11] 0.46, [7.50] 0.06, [6.85]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Correlation coefficient 0.39 1.18 1.23 0.96 1.13 2.30nn 2.04nn 2.00n 2.05n 1.97nn 1.95nn 1.70n 1.81n
[0.45] [1.43] [1.53] [1.19] [1.37] [2.21] [2.01] [1.94] [1.95] [2.00] [2.04] [1.77] [1.83]
InvTmtþ jInvTmt1 0.10, 0.07, 0.07 1.01nnn 0.99nnn 0.94nnn 1.26nnn 1.25nnn 1.20nnn 1.11nnn 1.09nnn 1.08nnn
[1.32, 1.40, 1.46] [3.67] [3.64] [3.25] [3.91] [3.87] [3.66] [3.93] [3.87] [3.75]
Bidder cv 0.61 3.07nnn 3.02nnn 0.76 0.85 2.02 2.06
[0.31] [2.64] [2.60] [0.51] [0.57] [1.45] [1.47]
Target cv 0.52 1.2 0.97 0.7 0.63 2.31 2.35
[0.32] [1.07] [0.85] [0.46] [0.42] [1.55] [1.57]
InvTbt1InvTgt1 8.33 0.01 0.01 0
[81.97] [1.62] [1.54] [0.19]
Bidder size $2,308 0 0 0
[$4,518] [0.71] [0.99] [0.64]
Target size $578 0 0 0
[$1,731] [0.18] [0.19] [0.04]
Intercept 0.13 0.21 0.94 0.85 0.44 0.28 1.09 0.97 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.46
[0.27] [0.45] [0.97] [0.88] [0.71] [0.45] [0.87] [0.77] [1.20] [1.10] [0.49] [0.38]
N 270 270 270 270 248 248 248 248 230 230 230 230
Adj. R2 (%) 0.38 4.81 6.7 6.89 1.54 6.94 6.39 6.57 1.29 7.18 7.98 6.97
F-test 2.04 7.79 5.83 3.85 4.87 10.21 5.21 3.48 3.99 9.85 5.96 3.45
Notes: t-Statistics are shown in square brackets.
n Denotes statistical significance at 10% levels.
nn Denotes statistical significance at 5% levels.
nnn Denotes statistical significance at 1% levels.
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firm. Second, Berman et al. (2011) show non-monotonic effects of
variability. When the variation is below a threshold level, the absolute
cost savings is increasing in variability, but beyond this threshold, the
savings decreases. Thus, we believe that the effect of demand variability
requires a more detailed analysis including data splitting according to
the size of demand variability consistent with the theoretical findings.
Moreover, while we use the coefficient of variation to measure demand
variability following Randall et al. (2006), there are alternative proce-
dures to calculate variability.
We conducted unreported (available upon request from authors)
tests to include the quadratic effects of demand variabilities on
inventory performance improvements after a merger. In the first
and second years following the merger, the inclusion of the quadratic
effect results in either decreased or the same adjusted R2. The adjusted
R2 increases at a noticeable amount only in the third year following
the merger, in which first-degree effects remain the same and the
second-degree effect of the target variability proves to be significant.
However, the results are still not significant enough to make a strong
judgment on the first or second-degree effects of demand variabilities
on inventory pooling benefits.
This study is one of the very first attempts to test the predictions of
inventory centralization theory using real data. Follow-up studies may
improve the findings in three directions. First, as we do not have
information on the individual policy changes that are enacted follow-
ing a merger, we cannot forcefully say the results are due to a strategic
change in inventory management. Follow-up studies may undertake
case studies and analyze whether the merged firms with negative
demand correlation in the sample did centralize inventory decisions
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2009).
Second, inventory management models in the literature are at
product level. However, we only have access to firm-level inventory
data from COMPUSTAT. Firm-level inventory data is reported for all
products of the firm aggregated as raw materials, work-in-process,
finished goods, and their total. In this study, we used total inventory, as
the data on raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods have
many missing company-year entries, which prevent us to compute
demand variability and demand correlation. Thus, with secondary
sources such as COMPUSTAT, it is difficult to obtain product-level data.
Data on product-level inventories of merging firms would offer more
detailed analysis of the theoretical models on inventory management.
Third, alternative measurements of inventory performance may be
used. One alternative is the inventory turnover curve method proposed
by Ballou (1981). Ballou (1981) and Ballou (2000) use sales and absolute
inventory level data of various stocking points for similar products to
define the relationship between sales and inventory. A turnover curve
can be used to evaluate the inventory performance of merging firms.
Eroglu and Hofer (2011) investigate the relationship between the
financial performance and the inventory leanness of U.S. manufacturing
firms, where the inventory leanness is calculated with the deviation of
a firm’s inventory level from the turnover curve fitted for its industry.
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